Atheistic Moral Platonism
There is an objection to the moral argument for God’s existence, specifically the premise which states the best explanation for the foundation for objective moral values and duties is God. It is the idea that moral values and duties can be plausibly anchored in some transcendent, non-theistic ground. That moral values and duties exist objectively, but as brute facts, not needing an explanation for their existence. They are sort of eternal unchanging ideas that are necessary features of the universe. This position we shall call Atheistic Moral Platonism, and there are three ways we could respond.
First, this view is difficult to even comprehend. What does it mean for “Love” to just exist? In the absence of people this value just doesn’t seem to make any sense. I understand what it means to be loving towards a person, but for the moral virtue Love to exist in the absence of people is just incomprehensible.
Second, the nature of moral obligation is incomprehensible on this view. If it is the case that these moral values such as Mercy, Love, and Justice just exist, unfounded and independently of God, what or who lays upon me an obligation to be merciful, or loving, or just? There are other sets of values also, like Greed, Hatred and Selfishness. Why am I obligated to choose one set of values over another?
Third, it is fantastically improbable that just the sort of creature would emerge from the blind evolutionary process would correspond to the abstractly existing realm of moral values and obligations. That our awareness of moral values and obligations derived from our evolutionary background, and this realm of objective moral values and obligations – two entirely separate orders of reality – found each other and corresponded is breathtakingly contrived.
And so this Atheistic Moral Platonism, as a sort of escape hatch for the conclusions of our argument, is in my view, on evaluation, not at all successful.
In: Contributors, political, theology
